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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had a very quiet
year in terms of trademark decisions, issuing only four decisions in
2013.1 This number is a notable decline from the Federal Circuit’s
 This Area Summary reflects the Authors’ current thoughts on the subject
matter and should not be attributed, in whole or in part, to Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, LLP or any of its clients. This Area Summary is not meant to convey legal
opinions or legal advice of any kind.
 Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; J.D., American University, Washington
College of Law, 1996; B.A., Jewish and Near Eastern Studies, Washington University,
1993. Ms. Polott was the Note & Comment Editor of the American University Law
Review during law school.
 Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; J.D., American University, Washington
College of Law, 2011; B.A., Political Science and Criminology, University of Florida,
2005. Ms. Justus was the Editor-in-Chief of the American University Intellectual Property
Brief during law school.
1. See In re City of Hous., 731 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that
section 2(b) of the Lanham Act prohibited the City of Houston and the District of
Columbia from registering their city seals on the Federal Register), cert. denied, 134 S.
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output on trademark decisions2 in past years, which included thirteen
trademark decisions in 2012,3 six in 2011,4 and twenty-three in 2010.5
This year’s decrease in trademark decisions cannot be attributed to a
significant decrease in the court’s caseload, as its overall docket for
Fiscal Year 20136 was down only slightly from previous years, with
1259 appeals filed as compared to 1381 in Fiscal Year 2012 and 1349
in Fiscal Year 2011.7 However, the percentage of appeals pertaining
to trademark law that were filed with the court this year was generally
consistent with previous years, as two percent of this year’s
approximately 1259 appeals pertained to trademark law.8 Substantive
trademark decisions have not made up more than three percent of

Ct. 1325 (2014); In re Health Sci. Funding, LLC, 538 F. App’x 898, 899 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (affirming the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board’s (TTAB or “the Board”) finding that the marks PRASTERONE.ORG and
THE PRASTERONE COMPANY were generic and could not be registered); Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (holding that litigation in district court did not preclude Levi Strauss & Co.
from bringing a registration challenge to the TTAB because the registrations at issue
covered a broader scope of goods than the district court litigation addressed); Wax v.
Amazon Techs., Inc., 500 F. App’x 944, 946–47 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(holding that a likelihood of confusion existed between the marks AMAZON
VENTURES and AMAZON.COM).
2. This Area Summary uses the term “trademark decisions” to refer to decisions
that substantively address claims under the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051–1141n (2012). Practitioners should be aware that this Area Summary is a
survey only of the 2013 trademark decisions issued by the Federal Circuit that
substantively address Lanham Act claims and that other opinions issued by the
Federal Circuit this year may also impact trademark law practice but are not
considered or discussed herein.
3. See Molly R. Silfen et al., 2012 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 62
AM. U. L. REV. 991, 992 (2013) (noting that eleven of the thirteen 2012 trademark
decisions were precedential).
4. See Marynelle Wilson & Antigone Peyton, 2011 Trademark Law Decisions of the
Federal Circuit, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2012) (theorizing that the economic
environment and a diminished number of trademark applications in 2009 and 2010
may have caused a decline in the number of trademark cases before the court).
5. See Susan B. Flohr et al., 2010 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1159, 1160, 1162 (2011) (highlighting that out of six per curiam cases,
the court affirmed the TTAB’s decisions five times without written opinions).
6. Although the term “Fiscal Year 2013” refers to the period between October 1,
2012, and September 30, 2013, see Fiscal Year Definition, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm (last visited May 1,
2014), the caseload statistics during that timeframe shed light on the number of
cases filed in 2013.
7. See United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Historical Caseload, U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories
/Statistics/historical%20caseload%20graph%2083-13.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014)
(illustrating the court’s caseload since Fiscal Year 1983 and illustrating that the lowest
number of appeals per year in recent history was 1208 in Fiscal Year 2010).
8. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Appeals Filed, by Category (FY
2013), U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images
/stories/Statistics/fy%2013%20filings%20by%20category.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014).
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the Federal Circuit’s caseload in the past eight years.9 Despite its
relative quiet on the trademark front this year, the Federal Circuit
weighed in on several issues of note to the practice of trademark law
in its four 2013 decisions, each of which is discussed in detail below.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES

The court issued three decisions discussing substantive trademark
issues in 2013, including a case of first impression on the registrability
of government seals.10
A. Likelihood of Confusion: Wax v. Amazon Technologies, Inc.
In the first Federal Circuit trademark opinion of 2013, Wax v.
Amazon Technologies, Inc.,11 the court affirmed the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB or “the Board”) of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) decision sustaining the opposition to an
application to register the mark AMAZON VENTURES for
investment management services based on existing registrations for
the famous AMAZON.COM marks.12
Jeffrey S. Wax, a patent attorney and venture capitalist, filed an
intent-to-use application in 2000 for the mark AMAZON VENTURES
(with VENTURES disclaimed) for “investment management, raising
venture capital for others, . . . and capital investment consultation.”13
The application’s publication was delayed for eight years14 due to the
number of prior pending applications for various AMAZON.COM
marks owned by the online retailer Amazon Technologies, Inc.

9. See Statistics, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR.,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (follow “2006” to “2013”
hyperlinks under “Caseload, by Category”) (demonstrating that during this time
period, trademark decisions have comprised between approximately one and three
percent of the Federal Circuit’s caseload).
10. See In re City of Hous., 731 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (registrability of
government seals), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1325 (2014); In re Health Sci. Funding,
LLC, 538 F. App’x 898, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (registrability of PRASTERONE.ORG
and THE PRASTERONE COMPANY); Wax v. Amazon Techs., Inc., 500 F. App’x 944,
945 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (registrability of AMAZON VENTURES).
11. 500 F. App’x 944 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 945.
13. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Wax’s intent-to-use application was not published until 2008, eight years after
filing. Notice of Publication Under 12(a) from Commissioner for Trademarks, U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office, to Jeffrey S. Wax, Applicant (June 4, 2008), available at
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn78001126&docId=NOP2008060409
2535 (notifying the applicant that the AMAZON VENTURES Mark, U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 78,001,126 (filed Mar. 27, 2000), “appears to be entitled to
registration” pending any third-party objection during the 30-day publication period).
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(“Amazon”), which eventually either proceeded to registration15 or
were abandoned.16 Amazon opposed the AMAZON VENTURES
application upon publication, claiming priority and alleging a
likelihood of confusion and dilution.17 Amazon based its priority
claim on a number of its AMAZON.COM registered marks covering
various financial and business services as well as its common law
rights in marks containing “AMAZON.”18 The TTAB sustained
Amazon’s opposition, finding that Amazon had established priority
on the basis of its pleaded registrations and common law use and
holding that consumers were likely to be confused between
AMAZON VENTURES and the AMAZON.COM marks.19 Because the
TTAB held for Amazon on its likelihood of confusion claim, it did
not reach Amazon’s dilution claim.20
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision, first holding
that it correctly determined that Amazon’s AMAZON.COM marks
had priority over AMAZON VENTURES.21 Wax argued that Amazon
could not establish priority because the USPTO had denied
Amazon’s application to register AMAZON.COM for “financial
management [and] financial planning services” after Wax filed the
AMAZON VENTURES application.22 However, the Federal Circuit
noted that Amazon owned several other registrations for
AMAZON.COM marks with earlier filing dates than AMAZON
VENTURES, including registrations for various advertising, business
management, and credit card services.23 Therefore, the fact that
Amazon’s host of AMAZON.COM registrations did not specifically
cover financial services did not negate the priority of its marks for a
variety of related business services.24
15. The following Amazon-owned applications proceeded to registration: (1)
AMAZON.COM AUCTIONS, covering “commodity trading for others”; (2)
AMAZON.COM, covering “credit card services; and charge card services”; and (3)
AMAZON.COM Plus Design, covering “credit card services; and charge card
services.” Amazon Techs., Inc. v. Wax, Opposition No. 91187118, 2012 WL 1267957,
at *4 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 30, 2012), aff’d per curiam, 500 F. App’x 944. The registration for
AMAZON.COM AUCTIONS has since been cancelled.
See AMAZON.COM
AUCTIONS, Serial No. 75,669,200 (cancelled July 13, 2012).
16. Amazon expressly abandoned its application for the mark AMAZON
FINANCIAL SERVICES, covering various mutual fund and securities services, in
October 2004. AMAZON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Serial No. 75,677,294 (abandoned
Oct. 5, 2004).
17. Wax, 500 F. App’x at 945–46.
18. Id.
19. Wax, 2012 WL 1267957, at *9–10.
20. Id. at *11.
21. Wax, 500 F. App’x at 946.
22. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id.

TRADEMARK.FINALTECH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2013 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

4/30/2014 5:24 PM

1423

The Federal Circuit then examined the TTAB’s decision that
Wax’s AMAZON VENTURES mark was likely to cause confusion
with Amazon’s AMAZON.COM marks.25 First, the court agreed
with the Board’s findings that Amazon’s marks were very strong
due to their commercial fame and inherent distinctiveness with
regard to Amazon’s services.26 Wax attempted to argue on appeal
that Amazon could only prove fame for the full mark
AMAZON.COM, rather than the AMAZON term alone, and that
his AMAZON VENTURES mark was not confusingly similar to
AMAZON.COM when considered as a whole.27
The Federal Circuit rejected these distinctions, first holding that
AMAZON was the predominant aspect of Amazon’s marks because
AMAZON and AMAZON.COM were used interchangeably to refer to
the company’s services.28 The court also noted that Wax did not
argue against the TTAB’s finding that the VENTURES portion of his
mark was merely descriptive of his financial services (and indeed,
Wax had accepted the USPTO’s request to disclaim VENTURES
during the application’s prosecution period).29 Given that Wax
accepted and did not argue against disclaiming VENTURES, the
AMAZON portion of the mark was given even more weight in the
TTAB’s analysis.30 Further, Wax’s argument that the differences
between his and Amazon’s services and channels of trade weighed
against a likelihood of confusion also failed, as owners of a famous
mark such as AMAZON.COM “enjoy a wide latitude of protection”
and do not have to prove that the parties provide the same services in
order to establish a likelihood of confusion.31 The Federal Circuit
held that the Board did not err in its conclusion that the likelihood
of confusion factors from In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.32 as a
25. Id. at 947.
26. Id. at 946–47.
27. Id. at 947.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 947–48 (quoting Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)).
32. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The DuPont court held that the following
factors should be considered in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. (2) The
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods . . . as described in an
application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in
use. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels. (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of
the prior mark . . . . (6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on
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whole strongly supported Amazon’s position and affirmed the
decision sustaining Amazon’s opposition of AMAZON VENTURES.33
B. Genericness: In re Health Science Funding, LLC
The Federal Circuit tackled the issue of genericness in In re Health
Science Funding, LLC.34 The court affirmed the TTAB’s decision that
the marks PRASTERONE.ORG and THE PRASTERONE COMPANY
were generic for a website featuring information about prasterone
drugs and related topics.35
Health Science Funding, LLC (“Health Science”) applied in March
2011 to register the marks PRASTERONE.ORG and THE
PRASTERONE COMPANY (“the PRASTERONE marks”) on the
Supplemental Register for website informational services on the topic
of prasterone scientific and clinical research.36 The examining
attorney refused registration on the basis that the proposed marks
were generic for the services covered by the application and were
therefore not capable of distinguishing applicant’s services—a
decision that the TTAB later affirmed.37
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision that the
PRASTERONE marks were generic for information services
regarding prasterone, which is undisputedly a generic term for
synthetic dehydroepiandroesterone (“DHEA”).38 The court began its
analysis by noting that the USPTO bears the heightened “clear
evidence” burden of proof for establishing that a proposed mark is
generic.39 Health Science first attempted to argue that the services at
issue should be characterized as “publication services” and that there
was no evidence that the PRASTERONE marks were generic for such

similar goods. (7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion. (8) The
length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion. (9) The variety of
goods on which a mark is or is not used . . . . (10) The market interface
between applicant and the owner of a prior mark . . . . (11) The extent to
which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its
goods. (12) The extent of potential confusion . . . . (13) Any other
established fact probative of the effect of use.
Id. at 1361.
33. Wax, 500 F. App’x at 948.
34. 538 F. App’x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
35. Id. at 899.
36. In re Health Sci. Funding, LLC, Nos. 85255510, 85255541, 2012 WL 4763146,
at *1 & nn.2–3 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 19, 2012), aff’d, 538 F. App’x 898.
37. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 899; see 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (2012) (providing that
a word “must be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services” in order
to be registered on the Supplemental Register).
38. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 900–02.
39. Id. at 900.
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services.40 The Federal Circuit quickly dismissed this argument,
noting that the Board correctly classified the services at issue as
“information services.”41 The court further described the services as
relying on the exact description Health Science included in its
applications for the PRASTERONE marks—“providing a website
featuring scientific and clinical research information about
investigational medical foods, dietary supplements or drugs, namely,
prasterone or derivatives or analogs thereof.”42
The Federal Circuit also rejected Health Science’s interpretation
of the TTAB’s opinion as improperly holding that “genericness in
one class of goods or services is sufficient to establish genericness
for another class,” which would contradict Federal Circuit
precedent.43 The court noted that although the Board did state
that “because ‘prasterone’ is the generic name of one of the items
that is the subject matter of applicant’s services, it is likewise
generic for the services themselves,” the TTAB’s analysis “did not
stop there.”44 More significantly, the Board examined each
individual component of both PRASTERONE marks, noting the
undisputed facts that prasterone is generic for synthetic DHEA
and that “.org” and the word “company” are considered generic
terms.45 The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s finding that
the evidence on record showed that the term “prasterone” is
frequently used with informational websites on the subject of
prasterone and related scientific and medical information.46 The
Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the TTAB correctly
found that the addition of “.org” and “company” was not enough
to elevate the generic term prasterone to a registrable mark.47
Similarly, the Federal Circuit rejected Health Science’s reliance on
In re Steelbuilding.com,48 in which the Federal Circuit held that the
Board had mistakenly read a finding of genericness in one class of
goods or services to imply that another class was also generic.49 The
Health Science court found Steelbuilding.com distinguishable because the
Board made several reversible errors in that case, including too

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 900–01.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id. at 901.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id.
415 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1298–99; see Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 901.
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narrowly construing the genus of the applicant’s goods and services.50
The Board did not make such errors in Health Science.51 As the court
noted, the Board’s analysis correctly tracked Federal Circuit
precedent from In re Hotels.com, L.P.,52 in which the court affirmed
the Board’s holding that the mark HOTELS.COM was generic for
hotel information and reservations made via the Internet.53 After
finding that the Board’s genericness analysis was correct, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the refusal to register the PRASTERONE marks.54
C. Government Entity Seals/Insignia: In re City of Houston
In a combined precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit upheld
the TTAB’s section 2(b) refusals to register the government seals of
the City of Houston and the District of Columbia in two cases on
appeal from the Director of the USPTO.55
Section 2(b) of the Lanham Act prohibits the registration of any
trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or
other insignia of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or
of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.”56 The District of
Columbia (“the District”) applied in January 200957 to register its
official seal for a variety of goods, including shirts, pens, cups, and
hats, while the City of Houston (“Houston”) applied the following
month to register its city seal for various municipal and city services.58
Examining attorneys refused both applications on the basis that
section 2(b) prohibits the federal registration of government seals
and insignia, and both applicants unsuccessfully appealed to the
TTAB.59 The Federal Circuit combined the appeals as an issue of first
impression as to whether section 2(b) bars a state or local
government entity from registering its own insignia.60 Each appellant
presented a strikingly different theory to support its argument that
section 2(b) did not bar such registrations.61

50. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 901.
51. Id.
52. 573 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
53. Id. at 1301; see Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 901.
54. Health Sci., 538 F. App’x at 902.
55. See In re City of Hous., 731 F.3d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1325 (2014).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2012).
57. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,643,857 (filed Jan. 6, 2009).
58. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1329.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1328.
61. See id. at 1330–32 (explaining that Houston focused on the legislative
intent underlying the definition of the term “applicant,” while the District relied
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The Federal Circuit began its analysis with Houston’s argument
that it should be allowed to register its city seal because government
entities are not “applicants” barred by the prohibitions of section 2.62
As the basis for its theory, Houston proposed that section 45 of the
Lanham Act defines the term “person” as pertaining to an applicant
to include both a natural person and “a ‘juristic person,’ which
includes any ‘organization capable of suing and being sued in a court
of law.’”63 Because section 45 begins with a caveat that all definitions
are set forth therein “unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the
context,”64 Houston argued that section 2(b)’s context indicated that
Congress intended for the term “applicant” to exclude a government
entity attempting to register its own seal or insignia.65 In support of
this legislative intent argument, Houston contended that
unauthorized use of government insignia leads to confusion among
the public as to whether the goods and services bearing such insignia
are actually sponsored by or affiliated with the government.66
Houston also argued that the bar on government registration of its
insignia frustrates public policy, as the goal of the Lanham Act is to
protect the consuming public from “pirates and cheats.”67
The Federal Circuit rejected this interpretation of the legislative
history of the Lanham Act, noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.68 and United States v.
Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co.69 strongly supported statutory
construction based on the plain language of the statute unless “rare
and exceptional circumstances” required a deeper analysis into
Congress’s intentions.70 The Federal Circuit did not find such
circumstances in City of Houston, as it concluded that nothing in the
plain language of section 2(b) indicated that a government entity is
exempt from this prohibition.71 Further, the court noted that section
45 plainly contemplates that “applicant” can encompass a
upon the alleged congressional desire to implement the treaty rights recognized
in the Paris Convention).
62. Id. at 1330.
63. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012)).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
65. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1330.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 2 (1945)).
68. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
69. 553 U.S. 1 (2008).
70. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1330–31 (quoting Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 11);
see also Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194 (asserting that statutory construction begins with
“the assumption that the ordinary meaning of [the statutory] language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose”).
71. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1331 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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government entity, as the provision sets forth a list of government
entities such as “‘the United States,’ ‘any State,’ and ‘any
instrumentality of a State’” as examples of entities covered by the
term.72 According to the court, the City of Houston would certainly
fall into this category.73 Other provisions of section 2 of the Lanham
Act include express exceptions,74 which the Court viewed as an
indication that if Congress had intended for section 2(b) to permit
state and local government registration of its own insignia, it would
have expressly provided for such an exemption.75 Although the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding that the examining
attorney properly refused Houston’s registration of its city seal, it
noted that Houston had other options for preventing fraudulent and
potentially confusing use of its insignia.76 For example, the city could
pass an ordinance banning such activity or appeal to Congress to
amend section 2(b).77
The District took a very different but equally unsuccessful
approach in its appeal, arguing that denying government entities the
ability to register their official seals and insignia violated the United
States’ obligations under Article 6 of the Paris Convention.78 To
position this analysis, the District first argued that the language of
section 2(b) is ambiguous79 and that therefore, courts could examine
its legislative history and congressional intent.80 This contention led
the District to its theory that Article 6 of the Paris Convention
requires member countries to allow for the trademark registration of
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. For example, section 2(c) prohibits the registration of a trademark that
“[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular
living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, or portrait of a
deceased President of the United States during the life of his widow, if any, except by
the written consent of the widow.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
75. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1331.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1331–32; see Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
art. 6, Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 325
[hereinafter Paris Convention]. The Paris Convention is a global intellectual
property treaty that established a “Union” of member countries for the protection of
industrial property. See Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (1883), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html (last visited May 1, 2014) (summarizing the
creation and goals of the Paris Convention). Article 6 of the Paris Convention
provides for the consistent recognition of registered trademarks among member
countries. See Paris Convention, supra, 21 U.S.T. at 1639–46, 828 U.N.T.S. at 324–33.
79. City of Hous., 731 F.3d at 1332. The District set forth that section 2(b)’s
language is not plain on its face because the USPTO has previously allowed for the
registration of three government seals. Id. at 1332 & n.1.
80. Id. at 1332.
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official insignia that are registered in other countries.81 The Federal
Circuit again disagreed with the contention that the language of
section 2(b) is ambiguous but held that even if the language did
allow for an examination of statutory construction, the District’s Paris
Convention theory did not pass muster.82 Article 6quinquies83 of the
Paris Convention provides that “[e]very trademark duly registered in
the country of origin shall be accepted for filing and protected as is
in the other countries of the [Paris Convention] Union, subject to
the reservations indicated in this Article.”84 However, Article 6ter85
modifies the general rule of 6quinquies with the caveat that the
member countries agree to refuse or to invalidate the registration of
trademarks that are comprised “of armorial bearings, flags, and other
State emblems, of countries of the Union.”86 Therefore, the Federal
Circuit found that these Articles relate to emblems of countries,
rather than those of local public bodies and cities.87 The District is
not “a country of the Union,” so its seal would not fall under the
protections of the Paris Convention.88 The court also pointed out
that the Paris Convention applies to trademarks that are already “duly
registered in the country of origin,” a category under which the
District’s trademark application did not fall.89
The Federal Circuit’s suggestion that the appellants in City of
Houston had other options at their disposal if they disagreed with the
Lanham Act’s prohibition on the registration of government indicia
did not go unheard. Two months after the court issued its decision
in City of Houston, several members of the U.S. House of
Representatives and Senate introduced a bipartisan bill urging
Congress to amend the Lanham Act and allow the United States
federal, state, and local governments to register their “flag[s], coat[s]
81. Id. at 1334.
82. See id. at 1333 (asserting to the contrary that section 2(b)’s language “is quite
plain on its face”).
83. The suffix “-quinquies” is a Latin suffix meaning, in this context, the “fifth
subsection.” Id. at 1334 n.2.
84. Id. at 1334 (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 78, 21 U.S.T. at 1643, 828
U.N.T.S. at 331).
85. The suffix “-ter” means the “third subsection.” Id. at 1334 n.2.
86. Id. at 1334 (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 78, 21 U.S.T. at 1640, 828
U.N.T.S. at 327).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting the District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871, 16 Stat. 419
(1871), which declares that the District “constitute[s] a body corporate for municipal
purposes, and may . . . have a seal, and exercise all the powers of a municipal
corporation”).
89. See id. at 1335 (quoting Paris Convention, supra note 78, 21 U.S.T. at 1643,
828 U.N.T.S. at 331) (noting that this rationale would be “circular,” since answering
the question at issue—whether the mark can be registered in the United States—in
the affirmative is the very requirement necessary for Article 6quinquies to apply).
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of arms, or other official insignia” with the USPTO.90 The bill, which
was introduced in the House and referred to the House Judiciary
Committee on December 12, 2013, would add an exception to
section 2(b), which currently states:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration
on the principal register on account of its nature unless it . . .
[c]onsists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia
of the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any
foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.91

The bill would add to the end of this provision the exception that
“this subsection shall not prevent the United States, or any State,
municipality, county, political subdivision, or other governmental
authority in the United States, from obtaining registration under this
Act of any mark that consists of or comprises its own flag, coat of
arms, or other official insignia.”92 If enacted, trademark practitioners
could expect a host of applications by state and local government
entities seeking to protect their respective seals and indicia.
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES
The court issued one procedural trademark law decision in 2013,
which discussed the potentially far-reaching implications of claim and
issue preclusion.
A. Claim/Issue Preclusion: Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Trading Co.
In its sole trademark procedural decision of the year, Levi Strauss &
Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.,93 the Federal Circuit reversed
the TTAB’s decision that district court litigation precludes USPTO
opposition and cancellation proceedings. In this important decision,
the court thereby opened the door to trademark registration
challenges by unsuccessful district court litigants.94
Appellee Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. (“Abercrombie”)
created a “mirror image stitching design” (“the Abercrombie
Design”) for use on a line of jeans sold in its Ruehl brand stores and
obtained registration (“the Abercrombie Design Registration”) of its
design for “[c]lothing, namely, jeans, skirts, [and] pants” on the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

S. 1816, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 3713, 113th Cong. (2013).
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
S. 1816, 113th Cong. § 1; H.R. 3713, 113th Cong. § 1.
719 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1369.
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Supplemental Register.95 Abercombie’s application to register its
design was refused registration on the Principal Register after the
examining attorney held that the mark was “merely a decorative or
ornamental feature of the goods” and therefore was incapable of
serving the source-indicating function of a trademark on the
Principal Register.96 Abercrombie amended the application to seek
registration on the Supplemental Register after failing to persuade
the examining attorney that the mark should be registered on the
Principal Register.97

While the application for the Abercrombie Design Registration was
pending, Abercrombie filed an application (the “Abercrombie
Design Application”) for the Abercrombie Design covering
“[c]lothing, namely, jeans, skirts, shorts, pants and jackets” to the
Principal Register.98 Upon publication of the Abercrombie Design
Application, Appellant Levi Strauss & Co. (“Levi Strauss”) filed an
opposition to the Abercrombie Design Application and a petition to
cancel the Abercrombie Design Application.99 Levi Strauss based its
opposition and cancellation petition on its “Arcuate” stitching
trademark (“the Arcuate Design”), for which it owned four federal
trademark registrations and claimed use dating from 1873.100
95. Registration No. 3,451,669; see Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1368–69.
96. See Office Action from Caroline E. Wood, Trademark Examining Attorney,
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Kathryn M. Wheble, Counsel to Applicant
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. (Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://tsdr.uspto.gov
/documentviewer?caseId=sn78977782&docId=OOA20080222090744.
97. See Request for Reconsideration After Final Action from Reid M. Wilson and
Christine B. Redfield, Attorney of Record, to Commissioner for Trademarks, U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office (May 1, 2008), http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?case
Id=sn78977782&docId=RFR20080502170254 (requesting reconsideration of the
examining attorney’s final action with respect to U.S. Trademark Application Serial
No. 78,977,782).
98. Trademark Application Serial No. 78,977,782; see Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369.
99. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369.
100. Id.; see Registration No. 0,404,248 (issuing November 16, 1943, for use on
“waistband type overalls”); Registration No. 1,139,254 (issuing on September 2, 1980,
for use on “pants, jackets, skirts, and shorts”); Registration No. 2,791,156 (issuing on
December 9, 2003, for use on “pants, jeans, shorts, shirts, t-shirts, blouses, skirts and
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Shortly thereafter, Levi Strauss sued Abercrombie in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that
the Abercrombie Design infringed and diluted its Arcuate Design.101
The USPTO suspended Levi Strauss’s opposition and cancellation
proceedings pending resolution of the suit.102 The district court held
in separate decisions that the Abercrombie Design, which only
appeared on jeans sold in Abercrombie’s Ruehl stores, did not
infringe or dilute Levi Strauss’s Arcuate Design given the disparate
channels of trade and price points for the parties’ respective jeans
(“the 2009 Infringement Judgment” and “the 2009 Dilution
Judgment,” respectively).103 Levi Strauss appealed the district
court’s dilution decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed and remanded on the basis that the lower
court erroneously relied on the standard that the marks at issue
jackets”); Registration No. 2,794,649 (issuing on December 16, 2003, for use on
“pants, jeans, shorts, shirts, t-shirts, blouses, skirts and jackets”).
101. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369; Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Trading Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 811, 812 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
102. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1369.
103. Id. at 1370; see Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., No.
07-03752 JSW, 2009 WL 1082175 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2009) (judgment on trademark
dilution and trademark infringement), rev’d, 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011).
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must be “identical or nearly identical” in order for dilution by
blurring to occur.104
Further
complicating
matters,
Abercrombie
ultimately
discontinued its Ruehl brand during the appeal but then filed a new
trademark application for the Abercrombie Design covering
“clothing, namely bottoms” in connection with its recently
announced Gilly Hicks brand.105 On remand to the district court,
Levi Strauss, concerned that the Gilly Hicks products were priced
closer to Levi Strauss’s price points, asked Abercrombie to amend the
pleadings or augment the record to address the Gilly Hicks product
line.106 Abercrombie refused, and the district court declined Levi
Strauss’s motion to amend its complaint without explanation.107
Soon after, Levi Strauss voluntarily moved to dismiss its dilution
claim, which the district court granted with prejudice (the “2011
Final Dilution Judgment”).108
After the district court suit was dismissed, Abercrombie filed
motions for summary judgment in the USPTO opposition and
cancellation proceedings, arguing that Levi Strauss’s challenges were
barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.109 The Board
disagreed with Abercrombie’s claim preclusion argument, holding
that the doctrine did not apply because of the “significant
differences” between the facts required to establish infringement in a
district court case and those required to oppose a trademark
application or cancel a registration.110 However, the Board agreed
that the elements of issue preclusion barred Levi Strauss’s claims and
granted summary judgment to Abercrombie.111 Levi Strauss appealed
to the Federal Circuit.112

104. Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Levi Strauss, 2009 WL 1082175, at *9).
105. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1370.
106. Id. Although the court’s decision refers to Abercrombie’s “Gilley Hicks”
brand, the correct spelling of the brand as used by both parties is “Gilly Hicks,”
which this Area Summary uses.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1370–71. The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents a litigant from
raising issues in a subsequent suit that should have been raised in the first action if
there was a judgment on the merits in the first action and the actions share the
“same cause of action” involving the same transactional facts. Id. at 1371 (quoting
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979)). Issue preclusion bars a
subsequent action for issues that have already been fully litigated in an earlier suit
where the earlier determination was necessary to the judgment in that suit. Id.
110. Id. at 1371; Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.,
Opposition No. 91175601, 2012 WL 1267965, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2012), rev’d,
719 F.3d 1367.
111. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1371; Levi Strauss, 2012 WL 1267965, at *7.
112. Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1371.
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The Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s decision, holding that Levi
Strauss’s registration challenges were not barred by claim or issue
preclusion.113 The court began by noting that a reversed judgment
cannot support preclusion of either type and that the Ninth Circuit
reversed both the 2009 Dilution Judgment and the district court’s
findings accompanying the judgment.114 These reversals left both the
2009 Infringement Judgment and the 2011 Final Dilution Judgment as
possible bases for the preclusion analysis.115
With respect to issue preclusion, the Federal Circuit found that the
2011 Final Dilution Judgment resulted from Levi Strauss’s voluntary
dismissal.116 The 2011 Final Dilution Judgment could be considered
an adjudication on the merits as required for claim preclusion.117 It
was not, however, a decision on any “issue” in the suit and therefore
could not be used as a basis for issue preclusion.118 The court
observed that the 2009 Infringement Judgment was therefore the
only remaining basis for issue preclusion and that this judgment was
decided on the merits.119 However, the court previously held that the
2009 Infringement Judgment could not bar Levi Strauss’s TTAB
actions given the widely disparate set of issues between Levi Strauss’s
TTAB opposition and cancellation proceedings and those presented
to the district court.120 The TTAB proceedings were based on the
Abercrombie Design Application and required an analysis of all of
the goods sought in the application.121 In contrast, the district court
infringement suit focused on whether Abercrombie’s marketing of its
specific Ruehl-brand jeans featuring the Abercrombie Design was
likely to cause confusion with Levi Strauss’s Arcuate Design.122 This
difference in the scope of issues meant that Levi Strauss’s TTAB
claims were not barred by issue preclusion and that the Board erred
in its ruling on this aspect.123
The Federal Circuit also reversed the Board’s dismissal on the
alternative ground that Levi Strauss’s challenges at the USPTO were

113. Id. at 1369, 1371.
114. Id. at 1372.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (clarifying that because the judgment was a voluntary dismissal with
prejudice, it amounted to a decision on the merits for claim- but not issue-preclusion
purposes).
118. Id. at 1372–73.
119. Id. at 1373.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1373–74.
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barred by claim preclusion.124 Claim preclusion requires an identity
of parties, a final judgment on the merits, and the same transactional
facts; in this case, the parties were identical, and the 2009
Infringement Judgment and the 2011 Final Dilution Judgment were
both judgments on the merits.125 Thus, the Board erred in holding
that the transactional facts in the USPTO challenges were the same as
those weighed by the district court.126 With regard to the 2009
Infringement Judgment, the Federal Circuit’s prior judgments in Jet,
Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems127 and Mayer/Berkshire Corp. v. Berkshire
Fashions, Inc.128 “squarely controlled” and supported the court’s
finding that a claim for trademark infringement cannot bar
trademark opposition or cancellation proceedings before the
Board.129 Although these decisions did not address a prior dilution
claim, the court explained that its rationale in those cases could be
extended to the 2011 Final Dilution Judgment.130 Because the
dilution claim also “involved a distinctly narrower set of productspecific transactional facts than those at issue in the [TTAB]
proceedings,” the court held that the 2011 Final Judgment on
Dilution was similarly not claim preclusive in the TTAB
proceedings.131 The district court case was limited to Abercrombie’s
Ruehl line, while the Abercrombie Design Application and the
Abercrombie Design Registration with the USPTO covered a much
broader array of clothing goods.132 Indeed, as the Federal Circuit
noted, Abercrombie’s refusal to extend the district court proceedings
to cover its Gilly Hicks line of clothing evidenced the narrow scope of
the action.133
The Federal Circuit concluded its opinion with a reminder that if it
had affirmed the Board’s decision that Levi Strauss was precluded
from pursuing its challenges to Abercrombie’s registrations, such a
decision would have required the owners of famous marks to litigate
the full range of possible uses for the allegedly infringing mark in
district court actions.134 Accordingly, the court held that neither issue
preclusion nor claim preclusion prevented Levi Strauss from
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1372, 1374.
See id.
223 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
424 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Levi Strauss, 719 F.3d at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1370, 1375.
Id. at 1375.

TRADEMARK.FINALTECH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1436

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/30/2014 5:24 PM

[Vol. 63:1419

challenging Abercrombie’s registrations with the USPTO and
reversed and remanded the case for further determination of the
Board’s proceedings.135 The remanded case is currently pending with
the TTAB.136
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit was relatively quiet with respect to trademark
decisions in 2013, deciding only two precedential decisions and four
decisions in total. Nevertheless, the court’s analyses of the TTAB’s
decisions in these cases should be of interest to trademark
practitioners. On the legislative front, practitioners can look forward
to following the progress of the proposed bill to amend the Lanham
Act to allow for the federal registration of official government seals
and insignia by the U.S. Government and its cities and states, in
contrast to the Federal Circuit’s affirmation that section 2(b)
prevents the registration of such symbols. In addition to this
interesting legislative development, trademark practitioners may be
particularly likely to find the Federal Circuit’s guidance on the reach
of claim and issue preclusion to be a helpful development where
their administrative and civil litigation practices overlap.

135. Id. at 1376.
136. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., Cancellation No.
92049913 (T.T.A.B. filed Sept. 9, 2008).

